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eliminated, the state could take advantage of statements made at
a time when there is a strong motive for truthfulness and little
inducement for falsification; the accused may in any event still
show a confession was made under compulsion of fear or hope
of gain and thus prevent its admission. The subjective test laid
down is extremely difficult to apply and, although this of itself
is no reason for the rule's being changed, it inures, so far as can be
seen, solely to the benefit of the guilty. If, under the protection of
the Texas rule, the position of the innocent accused were improved,
the rule would not only be desirable, but necessary. It is interesting
to note that on rehearing it was indicated that defendant was not
under the apprehension that he was in custody. On the whole, it is
doubtful that there are fewer innocent persons convicted in Texas
than in other jurisdictions where there is no necessity for such a
warning. Legislative action in this matter is indicated now as it
was some twenty-five years ago."8
Frederick L. Woodlock, Jr.
INSURANCE
VARIANCE OF POLICY TERMS AS COUNTER OFFER (TEXAS)
In Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Vela' the deceased made
application for a $5,000 ordinary life policy. The application
stated the effective date of policy should be the date of de-
livery. The insurer refused the requested policy but issued one
for $2,500, specifying September 18 as the effective date of policy
and providing for quarterly premiums. Authority to alter or waive
any terms of the policy was limited to named officers. Kubena, the
local agent, offered the policy to Vela, who refused to take it
until October 19, at which time Mrs. Vela took it to look over.
28 Ibid.
1 147 Tex. 478, 217 S. W. 2d. 660 (1949), rev'g 212 S. W. 2d. 210 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
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On October 26 she stated that she would accept it and made a
monthly premium payment figured by Kubena, for which she re-
ceived a receipt. Kubena took the policy and on November 23
mailed it to the home office for the purpose of changing the quar-
terly premium to a monthly premium.
Upon receipt by the company of the policy the premium pay-
ment was placed in a suspense fund, and Chandler, not a named
officer having authority to alter the policy, wrote Kubena that
since effective date of policy was September 18, it had lapsed for
failure to pay premiums and could be reinstated only by com-
pletion of a health certificate. On November 27 Vela wrote
the company requesting information. On December 4 Chandler
answered, stating that he had written Kubena concerning "your
policy" and that Vela would probably be contacted in the near
future by Kubena. Vela, however, was never contacted because
he left for San Antonio on December I and died there on Decem-
ber 12. The company was notified of the death on December 17
by Mrs. Vela and immediately denied liability on the ground
that the policy had never been in force. Nothing further was done
until in 1944 when suit was commenced, at which time the com-
pany denied liability on three grounds: the policy was never in
force; if it ever was in force, it had lapsed for nonpayment of
premiums; the insured took his own life.
The trial court gave judgment for the company notwithstanding
a jury verdict for insured. This was reversed by the court of civil
appeals on the grounds that the company had, by denying liability
for the reason that the policy had never been delivered, waived all
other defenses and that when Kubena delivered the policy on October
19 and received a monthly premium payment, this amounted to
a delivery and acceptance. The court reasoned that, since equity
considers that done which should be done, the mode of payment
was altered at that time to monthly payments and in the absence
of a premium date in the policy, the date of delivery became the
controlling and effective date of the policy. The court felt that
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the rights of the beneficiary could not be prejudiced by a letter
from Chandler to the local agent not seen by Vela and that Chand-
ler, due to his position of responsibility, was empowered to alter
policies despite the fact he was not named in the policy as having
such authority. Hence, when Chandler wrote Vela on December
4 referring to the policy as "your policy", it was an acknowledg-
ment of the validity of the policy and a ratification of Kubena's
action.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals,
avoiding all questions of waiver and of authority of parties by
holding that since the application was rejected and a new policy
mailed, a counter offer was made; and when it was not accepted,
there was no meeting of minds and the policy was never in force.
Where an effective date is named in the policy, it is controlling
regardless of the date of delivery; and since the policy was never
in force, a letter referring to it as "your policy" could not create
liability thereon-estoppel being of a defensive character and
not such as to create a cause of action.
It appears that the supreme court held correctly despite the
harsh result seeming to flow therefrom. Where an application is
made for insurance and acceptance is on terms variant from those
offered, the application is rejected, and a counter offer is made;
for the insurance to become effective the counter offer must be
accepted by the insured.' Many cases hold that a mere soliciting
agent has no authority to alter or waive terms of a policy3 and
that where the policy expressly denies such authority, the insured
is bound thereby whether he has read the policy or not.' Under
Texas law, where a life policy expressly specifies the date from
which the premium period is to be computed and fixes the date
2 Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hubbs-Johnson Motor Co., 42 S. W. 2d.
248 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931), rev'g 28 S. W. 2d. 1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
3 Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 133 Tex. 547, 127 S. W. 2d. 172 (1939);
Moffett v. Texas Employer's Ins. Assn., 217 S. W. 2d. 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), writ
of error relused, N.R.E.; TEx. Ruv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5063.
4 Morrison v. Ins. Co. of North America, 69 Tex. 353, 6 S. W. 605 (1887) ; Great
Eastern Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 178 S. W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
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for payment of recurring premiums, such date is controlling as to
premium payments irrespective of the date on which the policy
is delivered.' While it is true that where an insurer with knowl-
edge of a forfeiture takes action recognizing a policy as in force
without having been motivated to act by the insured, it constitutes
a waiver of the forfeiture,6 this could hardly be contended here
where no policy ever became effective. And though a denial of
liability on one ground with knowledge of others is a waiver of
suck other grounds,' it could not affect liability here, since the
insurer asserted the only valid defense.
ILLEGAL KILLING AS BAR TO RECOVERY BY BENEFICIARY (TEXAS)
In Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.' the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy were claimed by the named beneficiary and the next
of kin of insured, and the insurer filed a bill of interpleader. The
court of civil appeals held that the beneficiary should recover, but
the supreme court reversed and gave judgment for the next of
kin, saying that the beneficiary was precluded from recovery by
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5047.
The death of the insured had been caused by the beneficiary,
wife of the insured, after he had accused her of immoral conduct
and had made a vile threat to do her bodily harm. The wife Was
convicted of manslaughter, and the finding was made that she
acted without sufficient provocation. The statute cited precludes a
5 Henning v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 129 F. 2d. 225 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) ;
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Peddy, 139 Tex. 245, 162 S. W. 2d. 652 (1942) ; Kurth
v. Nat. Life and Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 79 S. W. 2d. 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), writ
of error refused.
. 6 Equitable Life Assur. Society of U. S. v. Ellis, 105 Tex. 526, 152 S. W. 625 (1931);
Bankers Life and Loan Ass'n of Dallas v. Ashford, 139 S. W. 2d. 858 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) ; Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Sunday, 103 S. W. 2d. 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Bridges, 114 S. W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
7 American Employee's Ins. Co. v. Brock, 215 S. W. 2d. 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948),
writ of error refused, N.R.E.; Great American Accident Ins. Co. v. Roggen, 1,44 S. W.
2d. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) ; Great American Indemnity Co. v. McMenamins. 134
S. W. 2d. 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), writ of error dismissed; National Aid Life Ass'n
v. Murphy, 78 S. W. 2d. 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), writ of error dismissed.
8.- Tex.- . 221 S. W. 2d. 857 (1949). rev'g 219 S. W. 2d. 137 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
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recovery by the beneficiary on a policy where the beneficiary has
"wilfully" brought about the death of the insured. The court
said that "wilfully", as used in the statute, requires both an intent
to kill and an illegal killing in order to defeat a recovery but
needs not have the meaning of "maliciously", as used in the
criminal cases. Almost all the courts passing on the question here
involved have held that where the beneficiary is illegally9 respon-
sible for the death of the insured, there can be no recovery-most
of these courts stating the requirements to be an intention to kill
plus an illegal killing.1" Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held under
the statute in accordance with the general rule. The probable in-
tention of the legislature in passing Article 5047" was to provide
for a statutory disposition of the proceeds while making no change
in the substantive law as developed in many courts.
FALSIFICATION BY AGENT No DEFENSE TO INSURER (ARKANSAS)
In Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Trantham" the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that a company could not avoid liability on non-medical
policies where evidence supported a finding that the insured made
a full disclosure to the soliciting agent at the time of making the
application but the agent omitted the disclosures and inserted false
statements concerning applicant's health.
Generally, where there is no fraud or collusion between the
insured and the agent of the insurer and there is no limitation
on the authority of the agent stated in the policy, the cases hold
that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the insurer." Some
9 While of sound mind and not in self-defense.
10 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (Dist. Ct. E. D. Mich.
N. D. 1941), and cases cited therein.
"The decision in Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S. W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918),
recognizing the injustice of allowing the beneficiary to recover on a policy when she
had murdered the insured, resulted in the enactment of what is now Article 5047.
12 214 Ark. 791, 217 S. W. 2d. 924 (1949).
Is Union life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 193 Ark. 627, 101 S. W. 2d. 778 (1937) ; Hart v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 47 Cal. App. 2d. 298, 117 P. 2d. 930 (1941); Ameri-
can Life Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S. E. 2d. 231 (1948); Liberty Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 61 Ga. App. 344, 6 S. E. 2d. 199 (1939); Bordelon v. National life
and Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 187 So. 112 (La. App. 1939); Longo v. John Hancock
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of these cases hold that where a limitation on the power of the
agent is stated in the application, it does not bind the insured
unless he has read the application. 4 These cases prevent the
insurer from asserting the falsity of the statements as an avoidance
of liability on the theory of the insurer's "constructive notice","
or of waiver of the defense of breach of warranty, 16 or of
"equitable estoppel". 7
Most courts probably hold that the insurer cannot avoid liability
on a policy where the insured makes full disclosures and the agent
fraudulently misstates them,'8 especially where there has been
no opportunity afforded the insured to read the application. Thus,
where by reason of fraud, mistake or negligence of a soliciting
agent the truthful answers of an insured given at the time of his
application have been incorrectly entered in the form used for
reporting the state of the health of the insured, the insurer is
estopped to set up the falsity of such answers as a defense to an
action on the policy. This is true whether the error was committed
by the general agent or the soliciting agent. In either event, he is
the agent of the insurer not the insured, notwithstanding the ap-
plication may stipulate to the contrary.' 9
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 153 S. W. 2d. 805 (Mo. App. 1941); Dace v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 148 S. W. 2d. 93 (Mo. App. 1941) ; Deval v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 262 App. Div. 933, 28 N.Y.S. 2d. 919 (1941).14 Deval v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 262 App. Div. 933, 28 N.Y.S. 2d. 919
(1941).15 Friedman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 S. W. 2d. 956 (Mo. App. 1941).
1e Rakowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 M1. App. 583, 59 N. E. 2d. 514 (1945).
1 7 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 116 F. 2d. 705 (C.C.A. 10th, 1940),
cert. den., 313 U. S. 561 (1941).
18 Union life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 193 Ark. 637, 101 S. W. 2d. 778 (1937) ; Gavenis
v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 284 Ill. App. 644, 2 N. E. 2d. 578 (1936) ; Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Lawnsdive, 235 Iowa 123, 15 N. W. 2d. 880 (1944); Tyson v.
Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co., 4 So. 2d. 603 (La. App. 1941) ; Boston Ins. Co. v. Rain-
water. 197 S. W. 2d. 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). But cl. Home Ins. Co. v. Lake Dallas
Gin Co.. 127 Tex. 497. 93 S. W. 2d. 388. (1936).
19 Union Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 197 Ark. 241, 133 S. W. 2d. 841 (1939) ; Hever v.
Truck Ins. Exchange, 51 Cal. App. 2d. 497, 125 P. 2d. 90 (1942) ; Hart v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 47 Cal. App. 2d. 298, 117 P. 2d. 930 (1941).
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-LACK OF TITLE A DEFENSE
(ARKANSAS)
In Southern Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Motor Finance Co.2" Hen-
drix brought suit on an insurance policy covering his car against
upsets and other hazards. The only defense to the suit was that
Hendrix was not the sole and unconditional owner of the car as
stated in the policy. The car had been stolen in another state
from the real owner and had been sold to Welch, then to Webb,
then to the F & F Motor Co., and finally to Hendrix. All these
parties acted in good faith and without knowledge that the car
had been stolen. After the car had been damaged, the Agricul-
tural Insurance Company, insurer of the original owner against
theft (having paid him and having become subrogated to his
rights), took the car without objection.
The trial court instructed that if Hendrix bought in good faith
without knowledge of the theft, the jury should find for him, but
the court went on to instruct that if the car was stolen, the jury
should find for the insurance company. The Arkansas Supreme
Court said that decisions in other states holding that after loss,
lack of ownership could be asserted only by the real owner were
correctly decided, provided the claimant was in good faith with-
out knowledge of the theft. But in this case, where the real
owner had not only asserted his claim but had removed the car
without objection, the insurance company, on proof that the car
had actually been stolen, was entitled to a directed verdict. The
court mentioned that there were statements in some cases con-
trary to the result reached here but that the clear majority of
eourts seemed to be in accord with the views expressed in the
principal case.
It was observed that cases in jurisdictions holding that a de-
fendant insurance company could not raise the defense of lack
of sole and unconditional ownership were careful to state an ex-
20 -Ark. -. 222 S. W. 2d. 961 (1949).
[Vol. 4
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ception that such defense could be raised by the real owner.2'
Thus, where the insurer had become subrogated to the rights of
the real owner, had claimed the car, and had taken physical
possession of it apparently without objection, the case was clearly
within the exception. All the cases holding that where the insured
was in good faith without knowledge of the theft at the time of
securing the policy, a recovery could be had on the policy, were
cases where the car was never recovered and no claim was made
by the real owner.22 Numerous cases have held that good faith
alone is not sufficient and that it is the falsity of the warranty
which renders the policy voidable."z Thus, the case is in accord
with the principle that insurable interest is a condition precedent
to liability on a policy 24 and that rights acquired in a car through
theft do not constitute such an insurable interest, although the car
has been purchased in good faith without knowledge that it has
been stolen.
GROUP INSURANCE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY (OKLAHOMA)
Spartan Aircraft Company v. Coppick25 was concerned with
a group policy secured by an employer covering all his employees.
One provision stipulated that the policy should terminate imme-
diately upon termination of employment for any reason,
but the employee had an opportunity to reinstate the policy
immediately, subject to his being insurable. Subsequently in-
sured's union made a contract with the employer under which
the employees were not to be discharged because of illness. The
21 Savarese v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 NJ.L 435, 123 Ad. 763 (1924) ; Norris v.
Alliance Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 1 N. J. Misc. 315, 123 At. 762 (1923) ; Mechanics'
and Traders' Ins. Co. of New Orleans v. Local Building and Loan Ass'n, 128 Okla.
71, 261 Pac. 170 (1927) ; Barnett v. London Assur. Corp., 139 Wash. 673, 245 Pac. 3
(1926).
22 Giles v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Missouri, 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S. E. 890 (1924);
Hessen v. Iowa Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 195 Iowa 141, 190 N. W. 150 (1922) ; Conti-
nental Ins. Co. v. Bunn, 144 Md. 429, 125 At. 232 (1924) ; Savarese v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 99 NJ.L. 435, 123 At. 763 (1924).
28 Smith v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 188 Mo. App. 297, 175 S. W. 113 (1915);
Affleck v. Kean, 50 R. I. 405, 148 AtL 324 (1929).
24 Harvey v. Pawtucket Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 250 Mass. 164, 145 N. E. 35 (1924).
25 - Okla.- , 207 P. 2d. 790 (1949).
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insured became ill, was discharged in violation of the union con-
tract, and was given notice of the termination of the policy and
his privilege to reinstate. The insured took no action. His illness
resulted in death. Plaintiff beneficiary sued the employer for
damages in the full amount of the ,policy.
The court held that the employer owed no duty to continue pay-
ments in order to keep the policy in force; that since the contracts
were entered into separately they would not be construed together;
that the union contract was not for the benefit of the plainiff
but for the benefit of the employee and, therefore, plaintiff could
not maintain the action.
This case is one of first impression. Notably absent is the cita-
tion of Oklahoma authority to support the decision. The first ques-
tion presented is, what is the duty of the employer to the bene-
ficiary? The rule is that the employer owes no duty to the bene-
ficiary to continue the policy in force.26 The courts have further
held that even when the employer takes the premium from the
earnings of the employee, the employer is not liable for allowing
the policy to lapse without notice to the beneficiary.27 The basic
reason for this holding is that the act of the employer is, at most,
a gratuity.
The next question is, should these writings be construed to-
gether? It is a well established rule that instruments, though sep-
arate, if made at the same time and for the same purpose, will
be construed together."
In view of the rules alluded to, it is believed that the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma reached a correct result. Several reasons may
be stated: (1) The employer owes no duty to the beneficiary, hav-
ing gratuitously undertaken to perform an act; (2) the employer
26 Gallagher v. Simmons Hardware Co., 214 Mo. App. 111, 258 S. W. 16 (1924) ;
Thull v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 40 Ohio App. 486, 178 N. E. 850 (1931) ; Thomp-
son v. Pacific Mills, 141 S. C. 303, 139 S. E. 619 (1927).
27 Myerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927).
28 Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Goforth, 193 Okla. 312, 143 P. 2d. 154 (1943);
Hud Oil and Refining Co. v. Smith, 179 Okla. 412, 65 P. 2d. 1011 (1937) ; Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Widick, 175 Okla. 376, 52 P. 2d. (1936).
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could at any time terminate the insurance, at his caprice, without
incurring liability to the beneficiary, because of the provisions
of the original agreement; (3) the union contract was made for
the benefit of the employee, not the beneficiary; (4) the two
contracts cannot be construed together because they were made
at different times, were dealing with different parties, and covered
different, but not entirely new, subject matter; (5) any cause of
action resulting from the breach of the union contract would not
run to the beneficiary, but would descend to the heirs of the
employee.
HAIL INSURANCE-LIMITATION PROVISION VOIDED (OKLAHOMA)
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Horne29 dealt with a
fire insurance policy with a supplement covering loss occa-
sioned by hail and other hazards. The fire policy contained a one-
year limitation clause. Plaintiff's home suffered damage from
hail on April 9, 1944, and his action was brought on January
26, 1946. The express limitation provision of the insurance con-
tract was set up as a defense.
The court held the limitation provision did not apply to a loss
occasioned by hail. The court observed that in 1909 the legisla-
ture passed an act to permit fire insurance companies to write
policies covering loss by fire and tornado, under which act there
was allowed a special limitation provision. In 1917 the legisla-
ture authorized fire insurance companies to write policies cover-
ing loss from hail and other hazards but made no mention of the
special limitation provision. The court said:
"There is no language in the title or in the body of the 1917 Act which
in any manner refers to or adopts the limitation provision in the
standard form of fire insurance policy and since this Act was the first
authority which fire insurance companies had to write hail insurance
policies in this state we think the absence of any reference to or adoption
of any provision of the standard form of fire insurance policy is strongly
indicative that the Legislature had no intention of authorizing fire in-
29 -Okla.-_, 207 P. 2d. 931 (1949).
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surance companies in issuing policies covering loss by hail to make
any other limitation than the general limitation apply to such policies
of insurance. '3 0
Further, the court reasoned, public policy does not permit exten-
sion of the exception to the general five year statute of limitation
by private contract, unless the contract is clearly within the pur-
view of the exception.
The court's reasoning and conclusions are believed to be cor-
rect and in line with prior decisions. It has been held that it is
only by reason of the specific provisions allowing a shorter limi-
tation period, provided for under the standard form statute, that
there can be a shorter period in which a claimant must maintain
an action. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius has
been applied to the provisions of the limitation statutes, the court
saying in effect that the expression of the exception excludes other
exceptions of a similar nature not expressed. 2 A federal court
has held that a provision limiting the time in which an action may




30 207 P. 2d. at 933.
31 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96, 220 Pac. 920 (1923).
32 Cummings v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 190 Okla. 533, 125 P. 2d.
989 (1942).
88 Utilities Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129 F. 2d. 798 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942), construing 15
OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Penn. Ed.) § 216.
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